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Abstract: Situated in relation to on-going critical discussion of the theory and practice of the rule of law in historical perspective, this article undertakes a comparative analysis of the offences of vilification of the State in the 1930 Italian Penal Code and the crime of seditious libel in English common law during the interwar period. It argues that there were important commonalities in the scope and objectives of these offences, which indicate that the apparently divergent legal systems of Fascist Italy and democratic Britain shared a similar approach to the conception and protection of State interests and their relationship with the rule of law. The article uses that historical comparison to highlight key continuities and tensions within each system, in order to question the meanings and significance of legal certainty and the rule of law, to reconsider theoretical interpretations of State power and law in the twentieth century, and to challenge understanding of common European (liberal) legal traditions as a positive force today.
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1. Introduction
The rule of law, and within that broad and contested concept the element of legality, that is the requirement of legal authority for governmental action and law consisting of clear and certain rules, are essential foundations for democratic systems today and yet also represent some of democracy’s most problematic challenges.​[1]​ As fundamental principles of liberal governance, the rule of law and legality encapsulate ideals of firm standards in the restraint of power, but need to allow for adaptability; and while constituting key mechanisms for the limitation of power, they are a primary channel for its exercise.​[2]​ The discourse about these competing dimensions of the rule of law and the extent to which they may be used to restrict or facilitate State action are crucial determinants of a given politico-legal order’s complexion, today and historically. Importantly, assessing the nature and significance of the relationship between the rule of law and political power needs to include the possibility of changes in the concept’s meaning and use over time,​[3]​ as well as continuities, and connections and contrasts across systems. These matters are especially important in the field of criminal law, which pitches State power directly against the individual and circumscribes freedom of action.
The paradigmatic expression of the relationship between legality and State power in the criminal sphere in contemporary Europe is undoubtedly Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the interpretation of which demonstrates both the importance of the idea of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege within the rule of law and its flexibility.​[4]​ Such flexibility is particularly evident in the context of crimes that are deemed to require interpretative leeway.​[5]​ This shows that even in modern human rights law, the restraint of power is tempered by recognition of the need for adaptability in its exercise, a balancing act that lies at the heart of rights discourse, especially in judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and its understanding of the context in which the State functions. This includes the scope and limits of rights with regard to public order, security and other State interests, as well as at a deeper level the need for democratic States respecting human rights under the rule of law to be able to protect themselves and their societies. Originally articulated as the idea of ‘militant democracy’​[6]​ and formulated in relation to anti-democratic political threats in the interwar period, recognition of that need informs the idea that rights and the rule of law should not - within limits - be rigid fetters on the State.
However, when the flexibility within legality is considered historically and comparatively, it becomes disturbingly apparent that it occurs with similar justifications in both democratic and anti-democratic systems, thus indicating a problematic intersection in one of the areas in which such systems might be expected to differ fundamentally, and underlining tensions between the ideals and practice of liberal law.​[7]​ Given the importance of normative appeals to traditions of respect for the rule of law in the construction of the two overarching bodies of European law today, such an intersection raises important questions about the nature and extent of shared legal values and the discourse about that heritage.​[8]​ As part of the process of substantiating and exploring these matters, this paper examines the relationship between legality and criminal law through two examples of crimes against the State in Fascist Italy and democratic (or rather democratizing) Britain in the 1920s-30s.
The aftermath of the First World War saw the rise of Fascism in Italy and the gathering momentum of representative democracy in Great Britain. Both forms of system developed in similar contexts of economic, social and political crisis engendered by the war, economic downturn and the Russian Revolution, and in both of them law was used to uphold and exert State authority. Although in many ways their political pathways were quite distinct, there were nevertheless commonalities between them that require close attention.​[9]​ In this regard, the area of crimes against the State is particularly indicative of State interests and their relationship with law.
Focusing on crimes of vilification (vilipendio)​[10]​ of the State under the 1930 Italian Penal Code (the Rocco Code) and the common law offence of seditious libel,​[11]​ the paper begins by identifying their principal dimensions and fundamental similarities in the way State power was deployed through law to tackle these political crimes between the wars. The paper shows how the vilification offences demonstrate an actively reconceived relationship between law and State under Fascism, and how seditious libel reveals the flexible nature of legality in practice in Britain. The paper argues that this is significant in terms of the comparative history of the rule of law under Fascism and democracy, critical understanding of theoretical interpretations of State power and law in the twentieth century,​[12]​ and consideration of the challenge of Europe’s ‘darker’ legal past to ideas of shared values today.​[13]​ In the on-going context of State responses to perceived threats in a time of crisis, this study provides valuable insights into the contingency of our legal traditions and the fragile identities of our politico-legal orders.

2. Vilification of the State in the Rocco Code
The offences of vilification against the personality of the State considered here are particularly notable because of the way in which they incorporated an ‘open ended’ concept to express the form of harm at stake, and related to dimensions of honour and respect that were of central importance to the Fascist understanding of the State. Vilification was one of several such ‘open’ concepts in Book II of the 1930 Rocco Penal Code on specific crimes​[14]​ and was used in a number of provisions, alongside other similarly flexible and related concepts of offence (offesa), disrespect (dispregio) and outrage (oltraggio) in relation to matters of prestige and of symbolic or spiritual importance. Without attempting an exhaustive list, a few examples are useful in order to illustrate this terminological flexibility and the sorts of issues in relation to which it was deployed in the Code.
For instance, vilification appears in Chapter IV, Title I of Book II of the Code, on offences against foreign States, their Heads and Representatives. Whereas Articles 296 and 297 use the term offence in relation to foreign Heads of State, Article 299 uses the term vilification in relation to the flag or emblem of a foreign State. In Title II on Crimes Against the Public Administration, Chapter I on crimes by public officials includes vilification in the title of Article 327, on incitement to disrespect or vilify the public authority’s institutions, laws or acts, although the definition of the offence only includes disrespect. Title IV on Crimes against Religious Sentiment and Sanctity of the Dead includes in Articles 402-404 of Chapter I on crimes against religion, offences of vilification of the religion itself and related persons or things. Also Chapter II, Title IV on crimes against the dead includes vilification offences in Articles 408 in relation to tombs or graves, and 410 in relation to dead bodies. However and in contrast, Chapter II, Title II on crimes by private individuals against the public administration uses the concept of outrage (offending honour or prestige) in Articles 341-344, covering offences against public officials, political, administrative or judicial bodies, and judges. Similarly in Title XII Crimes against the Person, Chapter II on crimes against honour includes an offence of defamation in Article 595 (‘offending another’s reputation’) rather than vilification.
	For the purposes of this paper the focus is on the use of the vilification concept in three key crimes in Title I, Chapter II of Book II on Offences against the Internal Personality of the State. These crimes are set out in Article 290 on vilification of constitutional institutions (including the Crown, the government, the Grand Council of Fascism, parliament, the armed forces and the legal order), which carried a penalty of imprisonment for one to six years; Article 291 on vilification of the Italian nation, which was punishable by imprisonment for one to three years; and Article 292 on vilification of the flag or other State emblem, which carried the same penalty as Article 291. Under Article 293, offences under Articles 291 and 292 could be aggravated if committed abroad. Understanding the significance of vilification in this category of offences requires engagement with its development as a criminal matter, its significance in relation to core Fascist values, and its particularly problematic nature in terms of legality.
	Looking briefly at the development of these offences, crimes of vilification were not innovations in the Rocco Code and echoed to some extent earlier penal laws around the Italian peninsula.​[15]​ The previous Zanardelli Code of 1889 (the first national criminal code of unified Italy​[16]​) also included crimes of disrespect, offence or vilification with regard to constitutional institutions and to the flag, and classified them as offences against the security of the State.​[17]​ This general category of offences against State security included crimes against the ‘Fatherland’, or elements of external security (territory, independence and unity of the State) and crimes against State powers, or internal security (covering aspects of the State’s political order).​[18]​ Although causing offence to the flag was classified as an external security matter, most offences of vilification were included in the internal security category. As Guglielmo Marconi has noted in his study of the history of political crimes in Italian law, the latter offences in the Zanardelli Code served both to repress forms of political dissent that involved disrespect to core State institutions, and to endow them with a special moral status that protected them from the shock of disagreement.​[19]​
Taking that pre-existing protection of the State to new heights, and building on the Fascist regime’s earlier special laws,​[20]​ the Rocco Code then used the term vilification more widely than the previous penal code,​[21]​ apparently to cover a greater range of forms of contempt or insult (albeit without terminological consistency, as the above examples indicated).​[22]​ In his commentary on these provisions in the draft code its principal drafter, the Minister of Justice, Alfredo Rocco emphasised the importance of the vilification offences in protecting the prestige of constitutional institutions, the nation and the flag.​[23]​ Underlining the relationship between them and Fascism itself, Rocco’s view was that the vilification offences completed the legal protection of the State by including its concrete and its symbolic and spiritual dimensions.​[24]​ The Rocco Code thus classified all these particular crimes against institutions and the flag as offences against the internal personality of the State. Importantly, such offences were placed at the beginning of the Code’s special part, indicating their hierarchical priority for the codifiers.​[25]​ The Code also made them punishable with harsher penalties as part of its generally tougher treatment of political crime and its broader schema of subordinating individual interests to the primacy of the strong State, both of which attributes have been said to be particularly indicative of the Code’s Fascist character in the special part.​[26]​
A commentator on the Rocco Code at the time of its introduction, Pietro di Vico (former military advocate general and a Senator) noted that the crime of vilification of the flag covered both a legal harm to the personality of the State and a political insult to the patriotism of the Italian people, thus affirming how such matters carried both a more concrete (public order) and symbolic significance.​[27]​ The criminalisation of vilification, he went on, was clearly related to the Fascist regime’s objective of protecting the strong State’s ethical dimensions, or personality, based on the twin concepts of (the State’s) ‘dignity and authority.’​[28]​ These two concepts indicate the value matrix at the heart of the Rocco Code, which placed the State first and considered it to be an entity endowed with a personality, demanding respect because it held and exercised power. Similarly, protection of the nation in Art. 291 also reflected Fascist ideological concepts of nationalism, the importance of ethnicity, ‘millenary’ continuity, and totalitarian indivisibility of the people from Fascism itself.​[29]​
	In terms of scope and enforcement, the vilification offences as political crimes came within the uncertain zone of overlap in the Fascist order’s dual court structures and covered a range of forms of conduct deemed offensive to the authorities. As Lutz Klinkhammer has shown,​[30]​ vilification offences could either be dealt with by the ordinary criminal courts or, if they were deemed important enough to be worthy of higher-profile treatment, could be referred to the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State.​[31]​ As Klinkhammer further indicates, selection for decision by the latter was not consistent and did not necessarily result in harsh treatment. In terms of scope, the offences were used to prosecute people for uttering a range of (often colourful) insults against State institutions and Mussolini himself, although the records suggest that despite such language not all those accused were ultimately convicted.​[32]​
In this light, as Guido Neppi Modona has argued, the open-ended concept of vilification, encapsulating a range of forms of offence or disrespect (whether in deeds or words, by action or omission), was thus far from certain in its meaning and scope of application.​[33]​ While enforcement was inconsistent, the law itself was constructed to incorporate maximum flexibility in the name of State interests. As such, it can be seen as a prime example of Fascist legality.
The nature of legality in the 1930 Rocco Penal Code – explicitly established in terms of nullum crimen, nulla poena in Article 1 ‑ has attracted much critical attention since the reform and anti-reform debates of the mid 1940s, and the development of a critical academic discourse from the 1970s onwards about its superficial and deeper meanings.​[34]​ Whereas the nature of legality in the Code’s general part has been contested in terms of its conceptual foundations in relation to Fascism and pre-existing authoritarian tendencies in criminal law under the previous political order,​[35]​ it is generally agreed that the Code’s special part clearly reflected Fascist priorities and values. These are apparent both in terms of the substance of offences and their form, especially where they upset the orthodox liberal (in the sense of post-Enlightenment) model of legality, according to which the guarantee represented by law was ensured by norms’ material objects and specificity, and instead made law simply an expression of authority.​[36]​
Although to some extent the concept of vilification in the Rocco Code reflected the pre-Fascist Italian State’s existing tendency towards authoritarian measures to protect its interests,​[37]​ including the use of discretionary norms,​[38]​ the concept nonetheless underpinned a set of particularly flexible offences. Located within the law, rather than extra-legally as an element of executive power, this open-ended offence could be adapted to fit a range of instances of disobedience and disrespect to the State, as required in the circumstances. Thus the values that the concept of vilification sought to protect – the primacy and identity, prestige and dignity of the State – and how it did so both reflected and supported the new sense of legality in the Rocco Code. The result was ‘a criminal law no longer based on offence against a specific good or interest, but on the violation of the duty to obey the law and the obligation of loyalty to the State’.​[39]​

3. Seditious Libel and Legality: Hypocrite lecteur, mon semblable, mon frère?​[40]​
Turning from vilification in the Rocco Code to the offence of seditious libel in contemporaneous England, it is possible to note some striking similarities between the two. Although seditious libel was not a direct equivalent of the Rocco Code’s offences of vilification directed at the internal personality of the State, in that it was used to suppress the expression of opinions deemed dangerous to the established order, it was similarly inherently political and open-ended, analogous in its terminology and scope, and gave the State wide discretion.​[41]​ As such, it survived from the age of royal absolutism and despite some changes in its interpretation and the dynamics of trials over the next three hundred years, it remained a not insignificant weapon in the State’s legal armoury for dealing with political opponents into the early twentieth century.​[42]​ Indeed, soon after the 1930 Italian Penal Code came into force, a British commentator, Herbert Finer observed ‑ in an apparently critical vein ‑ that the vilification offences in the Rocco Code punishing criticisms of the State were markedly similar in nature and breadth to seditious libel,​[43]​ but that that wide offence in English law was redeemed by ‘the safeguard of independent judges trained in law and justice’.​[44]​ Closer historical analysis indicates, however, that that was not entirely true.
Seditious libel is generally considered to be the most important, and longest standing, of three related offences, namely seditious conspiracy, seditious libel and seditious words, although there was historically no offence of sedition alone.​[45]​ Sedition itself was originally deemed to indicate an element of riot or insurrection, but the interpretation of seditious libel as requiring a connection with some sort of related and concrete (violent) harm only began to emerge inconsistently in case law during the 1800s. With its origins in the law of treason, in relation to which it has been described as the ‘other great arm of English law for the repression of political crime,’​[46]​ seditious libel initially evolved through decisions by the Court of Star Chamber in the 1600s targeted at punishing critics and parliamentary opponents of the Crown.​[47]​ Even after the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641, the offence survived in the common law due to its perceived usefulness,​[48]​ and it has been said that at that time almost no criticism of Church or State could be made ‘without running afoul of the sedition laws,’ which were applied by judges who felt that the business of government was not the affair of citizens.​[49]​
In the 1700s the offence continued to be used to deal with dissent in the form of written criticism of public men, the laws or State institutions, based on the view that rulers were superior to subjects and that open criticism was wrong and inimical to government, given the presumptive merit of the rulers’ decisions and deeds.​[50]​ However, the history of the offence in this period is problematic due to the limited nature of records and differing interpretations of trials and their dynamics.​[51]​ In essence, in a context of changing understanding of press freedom and the nature of political debate, it seems that it gradually became harder for the authorities to use seditious libel as a repressive instrument due to resistance by juries.​[52]​ This was largely due to a shift in emphasis from judicial determination of the offence in legal terms to the jury’s determination of its effect based on the facts,​[53]​ together with statutory confirmation of the jury’s role in deciding the mens rea of the offence.​[54]​ Even so, by the end of the century prosecutions for seditious libel ‘continued apace’,​[55]​ with the potential obstacles to success being addressed through jury packing in some cases, such as those against the French Revolution’s English supporters.​[56]​
Subsequently during the 1800s, despite an increasing shift away from seditious libel to unlawful assembly, the offence still existed and primarily concerned ideas of disrespect for government, with the interpretation of its object gradually being narrowed to focus on disturbance of the tranquillity of the State.​[57]​ Such disturbance required, more specifically, the encouragement of illegal and violent acts.​[58]​ By the late 1800s that sharper focus was also accompanied by some evidence of judicial awareness that seditious libel could be misused and that the jury was a bulwark against tyranny.​[59]​ Nevertheless, the offence continued to be prosecuted into the early 1900s​[60]​ and by the First World War its modern meaning had apparently stabilised. Still broad and open to interpretation, seditious libel at that time was deemed to encompass an intention:
(1) to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against, the Sovereign or the government and constitution of the United Kingdom… or (2) to excite the Sovereign’s subjects to attempt, otherwise than by lawful means, the alteration of any matter in church or state by law established; or (3) to incite persons to commit any crime in general disturbance of the peace; or (4) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the Sovereign’s subjects; or (5) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of those subjects…​[61]​

Most authorities agree (albeit with some hesitation) that, following the trend of the previous century, the central element of this wide definition was the likelihood of inciting at least a breach of the peace, or violent public disorder.​[62]​ However, in practice this was not always so and the principal example of that residual flexibility in meaning and prosecution brings us to the heart of this comparative study. Around the same time as the Fascists’ rise to power in Italy, a significant - but unreported - case of seditious libel in England in 1925​[63]​ showed that, despite the offence’s development over the previous centuries, its definition was still adaptable and it could still readily be deployed as a political instrument. Moreover, calling Finer’s subsequent view into question, the case showed that the trial process offered little protection to the accused where both judge and jury complied with the prosecution agenda.
In this important case the offence was used in the form of a conspiracy to publish or utter seditious libels (thus a crime both inchoate and open-ended) in a notorious, government-led prosecution against the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). While the case has since been described as ‘a ridiculous abuse of the common law offence of sedition at a time when there was not the remotest likelihood of insurrection or revolution’,​[64]​ it is worth recalling that at the time the CPGB was seen to represent a significant threat. A leading history of the CPGB notes that by the early 1920s - i.e. less than ten years after the 1917 Russian Revolution - the party’s members ‘were feared not only for their own revolutionary potential but also because they seemed to be the agents of a hostile foreign power.’​[65]​ This was exacerbated by tensions with Moscow over trade agreements and CPGB attempts to influence soldiers not to bear arms against other workers, the controversy about which led to the fall of the Labour government.​[66]​ More significantly, the CPGB had strong ties with the trade union movement and, due to a long-running dispute in the coal industry and the consequent growing threat of a general strike in 1925, was seen by the political establishment to represent a real danger to the British State. On that basis it has been observed that the 1925 seditious libel case against the CPGB grew out of the Conservative government’s ‘belief in the magnitude of the Communist threat.’​[67]​
Twelve leading members of the CPGB were arrested in October 1925 and charged with ‘having on divers days since January 1st, 1925, unlawfully conspired together to utter and publish seditious libels and incite divers persons to commit breaches of the Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797 against the peace of our Lord, the King, his Crown and dignity.’​[68]​ Based on meagre evidence, and at times involving almost comical cross-examination, the trial was in many ways counterproductive in giving the CPGB a public platform to air its views.​[69]​ Ultimately, as the principal recent study of the case underlines, even though the element of incitement of violence - generally deemed to be a central requirement of seditious libel by this time - was not established the judge’s direction to the jury to convict the accused anyway, in order to support the Government, was duly followed.​[70]​
The Government’s handling of the case was criticised by a leading Liberal MP, Sir John Simon, for appearing to indicate that justice was unequal and that opinion contrary to the Government’s was intolerable.​[71]​ More significantly, Simon attacked the Home Secretary’s involvement in the prosecution and the latter’s apparent admiration for the approach to such matters adopted by none other than Mussolini.​[72]​ In response, the Home Secretary insisted that freedom of speech was important, but only within limits, which were determined by the law and the need to protect the constitution.​[73]​ Although the Government was somewhat shaken by the critical response to its handling of the affair, the House of Commons subsequently gave its support to the principle that all governments were under a duty ‘to safeguard the State against sedition,’ without qualifying or limiting the political contingency of those terms.​[74]​
What this history and particularly problematic case of seditious libel show about the offence is that it was used to tackle a range of perceived threats to the State, due to the apparent danger they posed to intangible qualities of order, respect, dignity and esteem, with some narrowing in the offence’s scope and an increased role for the jury by the early twentieth century. Thus, as Finer pointed out in 1935,​[75]​ the law on seditious libel as it had evolved by then was not dissimilar to the vilification offences in the Rocco Code, in terms of form (analogous open-ended terms) and substance (State power and authority), but there were systemic differences that appeared to cast the English offence in a more favourable light.
However, the 1925 Communist Party trial represents a striking challenge to Finer’s subsequent confidence in the judiciary and the rule of law, indicating that the use of open-ended concepts in the area of political offences and an over-riding focus on the State’s need for respect and control - albeit in the context of an apparently serious threat to domestic stability - were not unique to Fascism in the interwar period. That said, it is important to emphasise that this is not intended to suggest crudely that these different laws or State systems were ultimately the same, and as the above outlines of prosecutions and trials have indicated, inconsistencies in the Italian approach and the role of the jury in some significant English cases meant that the offences were not ‘failsafe’ cudgels in the hands of the State. Nevertheless, the intersections between the offences indicate that similar concerns, objectives and methods were present in both politico-legal systems.

5. State Power, Crimes against the State and the Limits of Legality
As Head has observed, ‘[t]otalitarian governments are notorious for punishing their political opponents for “crimes against the state”, but history shows that governments regarded as democratic have also strenuously prosecuted these offences.’​[76]​ The reasons for this, he argues, are clear:
The most essential laws of any state are those relating to self-preservation, or to the upholding of the power and stability of the state itself. Beneath whatever appearance is given of liberty and democracy, there always exist those crimes – indeed often the ‘highest’ or most heavily punishable crimes – that are directed against any conduct deemed to threaten the state itself.​[77]​

In that formulation therefore the relationship between the rule of law and crimes against the State is of central importance. This section discusses it in three stages: the historically situated nature of legality in Italy and Britain and the significance of the above crimes; an over-arching thematic reading of those offences in relation to State security in the early twentieth century; and this study’s relevance to subsequent discourse about legal traditions.
As leading Italian studies have shown, legality (legalità) needs to be understood not as a ‘monolithic’ concept, but as encompassing both what might be called an orthodox model of ‘hard’ certainty in the scope and application of laws, and a range of ‘grey areas’ in which exceptional or flexible measures are deployed within a discourse of respect for law.​[78]​ This variable legality developed under liberal politico-legal orders due to what Luigi Lacchè has referred to as ‘the paradox of freedom,’ according to which the sorts of activities that a liberal State seeks to guarantee are the very activities that pose a threat to it, such as freedoms of press, expression and protest.​[79]​ As a result, the recourse to flexible categories of political crime reveals a more complex picture of legality in such orders, involving both determined law and exceptions or margins of flexibility provided for within normative frameworks, which indicate the tension between the purported subordination of politics to justice, and the actual subordination of justice to political expediency. Already apparent in late nineteenth-century liberal legal systems (and even before) this paradox and the flexible interaction of law and politics are also evident in subsequent approaches to protecting the established order.
In his landmark study of political justice, Otto Kirchheimer also referred to a similar problem in democratic orders, which he called the ‘major predicament’ of such systems, that is seeking to deal with the conflict between State power and self-preservation on the one hand, and on the other the management of freedoms of activity that may conflict with the State’s interests.​[80]​ In the ‘turbulent new era of mass democracy and totalitarianism’ after the First World War,​[81]​ law became an essential element in the legitimation of State repressive measures. In this sense Kirchheimer argues that law and legal processes were a way of shielding the State and organising repressive actions in the face of politically-motivated activities that were identified as threatening, or dangerous, with the legal dimensions presented as being both a neutral mechanism and a safeguard.
In Lacchè’s analysis, and as the above outline of the vilification offences has shown, Fascism drew on and developed the grey areas of pre-existing Italian law to suit its needs and, as Klinkhammer suggests, made a norm of and augmented what had formerly been exceptional.​[82]​ The reasons for this, Lacchè argues, were to be found in Fascism’s adoption and usage of the trappings of justice to represent and pursue its own political objectives.​[83]​ In this way the Fascist regime reinforced its power under guise of law and legal procedure, or in other words was able to replace physical violence with administrative repression.​[84]​
In Britain in the interwar period, it is likewise apparent that the relationship between the idea and the experience of the rule of law - or in Nicola Lacey’s terms the meaning and the use​[85]​ - also involved the co-existence of a theoretical model and grey areas. The contested but influential model of the rule of law formulated by Dicey in the late nineteenth century included the idea of the supremacy of law, circumscribed by the sovereignty of parliament, along similar lines to the idea of the common law constitution that had developed since the seventeenth century.​[86]​ Dicey’s model, however, sought to express limits on discretionary and interventionist powers that were belied by governmental reality.​[87]​ In essence, the constitutional principle boiled down to the long-standing common law tenet that government could do anything provided it was not actually unlawful and in breach of a recognised common law right (to the extent that the courts were prepared to uphold it).​[88]​
Similarly, in relation to criminal law specifically, the nineteenth-century model (as expressed by Stephen) involved an idea of the rule of law and legality that was only part of the picture. Initially emphasising the importance of certainty in defining crimes, Stephen also recognised the importance of elasticity in the criminal law.​[89]​ Just when Dicey was writing his theory of the rule of law, Stephen J declared in R v Price (1884) that
‘[t]he great leading rule of criminal law is that nothing is a crime unless it is plainly forbidden by law. This rule is no doubt subject to exceptions, but they are rare, narrow, and to be admitted with the greatest reluctance, and only upon the strongest reasons.’​[90]​

In that sense, Stephen was referring specifically to the possibility of judicial extension of the common law to prohibit new forms of criminal conduct, but the element of exceptions was in fact wider than that. Even though an existing prohibition might be stated in the law, and so ‘clear’ in the sense of declared, the terms used could still leave broad discretion within the law, especially with common law offences. The principle of legality was apparent, but the practice could rely on wide margins of interpretation.
By the 1920s-30s, two factors were of particular significance to the way in which such flexibility within the rule of law operated in practice. Firstly, the expansion of the franchise and the impact of the First World War on the context and methods of government meant that parliament’s nature and role were changing significantly from that envisaged in the Diceyan model, bringing with it a more interventionist stance and the need to tackle new forms of real and perceived threats, both of which required legal flexibility.​[91]​ Secondly, the application of statute and common law depended on judicial interpretation, but the extent of judicial independence from the other branches of power at that time was (for social and educational reasons) limited, so diminishing the restraining effect of the courts.​[92]​ So although scholarly commentators at the time still adhered to theoretical aspects of legality - including belief in its protective function​[93]​ - government within and according to law still left a wide margin for action without clear legal limits and, where there was such authority, there was not necessarily a reliable and consistent judicial tendency to restrict it.
Consequently, the interpretation that between the wars ‘government was not strongly committed to the rule of law’ and that its practices evidenced (the rule of) law’s ‘compliance and flexibility in times of expediency’​[94]​ needs to be approached cautiously. Although there was some not inconsiderable theoretical and doctrinal belief in the idea of legality at the time, there was nevertheless scope within that belief, and within the common law in practice, for such flexibility. Rather than being an abuse of a generally recognised fundamental principle, this showed that the law was primarily an instrument of governance.​[95]​ Both the Italian and English systems thus included the exercise of political power through open-ended offences and in order to protect similar values, and the rule of law in both countries can be seen as (to varying degrees) rule through law, with legality meaning more the certainty of decisions adopting legal form than a restriction on power (or rule within law).​[96]​
This study of vilification and seditious libel is of course both a narrow basis on which to reach a general conclusion, and at the same time an example that is indicative of a broader problem of how a democratic order may manage the threats it faces in a time of perceived crisis. Other studies of emergency powers also show how the rule of law and civil liberties have been, or may be, compromised under democracy in the name of security and the national interest.​[97]​ Indeed, as Laurence Lustgarten noted:
The values of liberal democracy come under the severest pressure when faced with demands for the control of individuals or groups regarded as in some way threatening to public safety or public order. The particular flashpoint is the extent to which the restraints demanded by the liberal values, notably the concept of legality, are dispensed with in the name of public protection.​[98]​

In that light, the example of seditious libel in the 1920s is perhaps not so surprising, but in comparative perspective it does serve to draw attention to some fundamental features of this sort of criminal law across opposing legal orders. Both forms of crime against the State, ‘Fascist’ vilification and ‘democratic’ seditious libel, can be seen to share characteristics identified in studies of political crime by Kirchheimer and later by Austin Turk - as diverse as they are in motivations - namely an explicitly political character, exceptional vagueness, and with a role of ‘public justification’ or legitimation for repressive measures.​[99]​ Both offences thus protected the State authority that must be obeyed, and were devices for channelling the power that sought to preserve itself. As Turk notes:
[v]agueness in defining the elements of such crimes as treason and sedition permits the insecurities and ambitions of authorities to override juridical reasoning in deciding their meaning in specific instances. Those assigned the task of political policing are given extraordinary leeway to find the most efficient means, the ultimate aim being preservation of the authority structure irrespective of legal constraints.​[100]​

Although in both systems the subordination of law did not mean that it disappeared entirely,​[101]​ it was relegated to a form of wrapping, or mask, over the exercise of political power, which was ideologically foremost in the Italian system and came to the fore in some instances in England.
In terms of values in these crimes against the State, both systems and offences considered here also had much in common. Whereas Fascist doctrine was explicitly focused on totalising unity (the State collective over individuals), obedience, and the dignity and internal personality of the strong State, it is also clear in the history of seditious libel that effective government was deemed to require respect, with concepts of esteem and dignity also recurring in the case law, and the fragmenting impact of opposition was feared and repressed.​[102]​ From the seventeenth-century cases through to the early twentieth century, the rationales expressed by the courts in seditious libel cases consistently adverted to the danger represented by challenges to State authority. Partly a necessary way of deploying criminal law to respond to variable threats, the development and use of such flexible offences were predominantly, for both systems, expedient in bringing the prohibitive and punitive force of the criminal law to bear in ways that sought to facilitate repression.
Yet while the history of seditious libel indicates that over the centuries the British State was generally intolerant of criticism, it is important to note that the perceived dangers of dissent were acutely crystallised for both the British and Italian politico-legal systems by the apparent Communist threat in the 1920s, which was deemed to represent a real and present risk to their interests. The repression of communism was a defining feature of the Fascist regime’s early years and its use of mechanisms of justice for political ends,​[103]​ a reaction that was echoed in Britain, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree, but notably including the above 1925 seditious libel case.​[104]​ In that light, this intersection between Fascism and British democratic government was particularly evident in the context of State responses to a specific dimension of European tensions and class conflict after the First World War.
Having considered the historical and comparative dimensions of these offences, their conceptual similarities in terms of legal certainty and protected values, and aspects of their context, it is also informative to consider them in an over-arching thematic interpretation of crimes against the State, that is as reflecting the beginnings of a more general trend across systems in this period. In his work on political justice, Kirchheimer pointed to a shift away from the dual concepts of internal and external threats to the State in the early to mid-twentieth century, which he connected mainly with developments during and after the Second World War.​[105]​ The commonalities of vilification and seditious libel confirm such a shared experience of a looser and more open-ended conception of State security, but the specificities of each offence show that that incipient shift in each system was not linear or uniform. More precisely, each system’s law included within a more general development cross-currents that seemed to conflict with the systems’ purported values.
As to the first point, the reliance by both systems on uncertain concepts to protect State interests can be seen as part of the same trend towards a generally broad protection of State security. Although the Rocco Code explicitly retained the two-fold division of categories of crime against internal and external dimensions of the State, a division that has remained in the Code, the open-ended vilification and related offences, both in terms of their formulation and objects, nevertheless appear to support the idea of a marked porosity in the concept of State interests. English law did not contain an explicit distinction between the State’s internal and external dimensions, but considered them together (as the seditious libel case law has shown); yet the central objective of protecting the State was also characterised by uncertainty, both in the intangible dimensions of State being protected and the form of the threat to it. Thus the breadth of State interests and threats reflected in both offences can be seen as part of the interwar genesis of the more generic security concept highlighted by Kirchheimer.
However, reading the above study of vilification and seditious libel in relation to the second point, it is apparent that the mechanics of that general conceptual shift in each system was not a linear development, but included apparently paradoxical continuities. As shown, the Rocco Code expanded on the authoritarian and flexible elements of existing law to support Fascism, thus showing a pre-Fascist legal continuity, or leakage, into the regime’s legal order. Similarly, the retention of the flexible common law offence of seditious libel in the democratic age meant the survival of an offence originating in the era of royal absolutism,​[106]​ indicating a similar process of continuity from an earlier period due to the law’s repressive advantages, but in contrast to the purported values of burgeoning British democracy.​[107]​ In that sense, the theoretical model of a general trend towards looser security concepts was not uniform and comprised internal tensions within processes of change in particular systems.
Lastly, it is important to reflect on the problematic aftermath of, and retrospective discourse about, these two politico-legal orders and what these two offences tell us about legality. As is well known in Italian criminal legal history, the end of Fascism did not bring with it the clear end of a discrete legal era. As the on-going legal discourse about the nature and legacy of Fascist law or law under Fascism shows, the conception of legality in the Rocco Code was both at odds with that concept’s ‘classical’ formulation and at the same time not out of line with preceding legal processes.​[108]​ It has moreover leaked into subsequent law, with problematic dimensions of longevity today.​[109]​ In contrast, the dominant discourse of twentieth-century British legal history has been one of democratisation, the virtue of the common law, systemic restraint and opposition to anti-democratic regimes. Yet as the above outline has indicated, British democracy has not necessarily always gone hand in hand with respect for (theoretically formulated) ideals of legality, or the rule of law as an unequivocal foundation, safeguard or source of supra-political value.​[110]​
Even though in post-World War II Europe developments such as new written constitutions (like Italy’s) and the impact of the ECHR and the European Union act as important restraints on executive appropriation and erosion of legal processes, there are nevertheless recurrent concerns about imbalances of power and repressive measures in the criminal law field when new dangers to the State are identified. The ‘flashpoint’ of the tension between legality and public protection in democracies is still an issue.​[111]​ Consequently, on-going critical reflection on States and law in times of threat, such as the period between the world wars, is important for refining understanding of what happens and why.
As noted in the introduction, a key concept developed just before the Second World War, and which has underpinned actions by liberal States in the post-war era to defend themselves, is ‘militant democracy.’​[112]​ Primarily focussed on restrictive measures against opponents in the political field, that concept is also apparent in justifications for measures taken by democratic States to protect their societies and their interests, even where such measures restrict liberties. Originally expressly formulated as a response to Fascism and Nazism, militant democracy was based on the idea of ‘the application of disciplined authority, by liberal-minded men, for the ultimate ends of liberal government: human dignity and freedom.’​[113]​ It is thus troubling to note that, within the scope of the examples comparatively considered above, the objectives and methods of Fascism and a leading democratic order were not in fact so different.
Such an intersection also leads to the further essential question of the relationship between means and ‘ultimate ends’ in these systems’ apparently similar formulation and use of crimes against the State, making justice processes the conduit for control and repression. Whereas criminal law under Fascism infamously sought to use law to make individuals the means to the State’s ends, reversing Enlightenment values, democracy as it developed in the nineteenth century and beyond was supposed to make the State the servant of the people and to respect fundamental principles, such as legality. However, whether repressive measures in the form of flexible crimes against the State could be justifiable means to serve the ends of democracy, that is the preservation of the democratic State against threats to its survival, is intensely problematic.​[114]​
However, it appears clear that in terms of means, both forms of system in the interwar period met on a common ground of limited legality to the end of the preservation of power. While democracy’s survival in the face of threats to its existence might through necessity appear to override concerns with process and principle, it may be that rather than justifying the means, the end is transformed just as, and because, the means are reshaped to achieve it. In that sense, the qualities of difference between Fascism and democracy can appear particularly fragile, and a government that favours a malleable rule of law treads a fine line between upholding its purported goals and adopting the modalities of that which it claims to oppose.​[115]​
More specifically though, given the close connection between the construction of safeguards such as the ECHR and the rejection of totalitarianism,​[116]​ exploring the identity and relationship between Fascism and democracy in historical perspective serves both to clarify and question such construction, and to adjust understanding of related politico-legal discourse in a wider context today. In that sense concepts of common European constitutional traditions and legal heritage, in their search for strength in the idea of a common democratic (or democratising) legal history,​[117]​ need to include reflection not only on the ‘darker’ legal past of extreme regimes within Europe, but also the ‘darker’ past of those legal orders that opposed them and that have not gone through periods of transition, or ‘overcoming’ such chapters of their history. Common traditions may have emerged and (not without exception) be converging along democratic lines post-1945 and post-1989, but the nature and legacies of legal practices before those dates still require careful attention in order to identify what exactly was problematic, what exactly was different, and what if anything has been left behind.​[118]​

6. Conclusion
This paper has discussed some apparent similarities between Fascism and democracy in the area of crimes against the State in the 1920s-30s and their implications for legality. In so doing it has argued that the commonalities in the scope of similar offences and the related treatment of legal principles across these two systems demonstrate a significant and problematic intersection between them in this particular period of insecurity and perceived dangers. Moreover, the paper has underlined the tensions evident in each system within a broader evolution towards looser concepts of State security and the importance of these connections for subsequent understanding of perceived (militant) democratic traditions. Although these matters must be considered in their deeper and wider context, which indicates that the systemic and political landscape in which the Rocco Code existed differed in significant respects from contemporaneous democratic systems, it is nevertheless apparent that the similarities in the legal sphere highlighted by these examples mean that such differences were not absolute.
It thus appears that the approach to crimes against the State manifested in the vilification offences was not in essence unique to Fascism, either in terms of normative values and method, or in terms of the politico-legal dynamic it represented. Both Fascist Italy and democratic Britain protected themselves against the negative effects of public dissent, criticism and threats to their dignity and authority by making the most of flexible laws to protect political interests. Although systemic restraints undoubtedly existed in Britain, they were not infallible. As a result, this study shows that the role of criminal law in the modern State can be indicative of deeper implicit continuities and similarities than explicit political differences suggest, or would seek to assert. In this sense, the question of systemic distinction is a matter of degree, rather than fundamental substance.
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